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A REEXAMINATION OF ANTITRUST LAW AND
EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL GRANTS
BY PATENTEES
MALCOLM E. WREEIER t

A patentee can employ various means to maximize the income he
derives from his patented invention. One of these is the exclusive
territorial assignment or license, by which the patentee divides the
nation into various regions and assigns or licenses one person in each
region to be the sole manufacturer, seller, or user of the invention.'
Three prominent antitrust commentators, Professors William Baxter,
Donald Turner, and Gerald Gibbons, recently examined the antitrust
implications of such practices,? and each concluded that existing antitrust and patent laws should be interpreted either to proscribe exclusive
territorial licenses and assignments or to strictly limit their use.'
On the other hand, the few courts that have faced the issue have
concluded that existing laws permit patentees to engage in such practices.' In apparent recognition of judicial reluctance to proscribe the
creation of exclusive territories, the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy (of which Professor Baxter was a member) has recommended that Congress eliminate exclusive assignments and licenses by
amending the patent laws to require that "a patent owner who has
t Associate Professor of Law (designee), University of Kansas. S.B. 1966,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1969, Stanford University. Member,
California Bar.
1 Strictly speaking, an "exclusive license" is a grant by the patentee or his
assignee of some agreed immunity under the patent, coupled with a promise to
exclude others from engaging in the licensed activities. The license is "exclusive"
because the patentee has promised to grant no further licenses of the type enjoyed
by the exclusive licensee, not because the exclusive licensee is the first or only licensee.
For example, the patentee may have granted one license under his patent prior to
promising a second licensee to grant no future licenses. See Western Elec. Co. v.
Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v.
Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 200-01 (E.D. Pa. 1956); 4 A. WALKER, PATENTS §381,
at 542 (2d ed. A. Deller 1965). This Article will assume for purposes of discussion
the usual situation wherein an exclusive licensee is the sole licensee in a specified
territory.
2Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 347-52 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Baxter];
Gibbons, Domestic TerritorialRestrictions in Patent Transactions and the Antitrust
Laws, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 893, 894-904 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Gibbons];
Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 450, 469-74
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
3 See Baxter 347; Gibbons 898, 903; Turner 474.
4
See Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945);
cf. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489-91 (1926); Deering,
Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 160 F. Supp. 463, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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granted a license with respect to his patent must license all qualified
applicants on equivalent terms." '
Thus it has been suggested that (1) existing antitrust laws can
and should be interpreted to proscribe or to restrict severely the use of
exclusive territorial assignments and licenses, and (2) if existing laws
are not so interpreted by the courts, Congress should act to ensure that
result. This Article reexamines both questions and concludes that
neither the proscription nor the restrictions which have been advocated
are embodied in existing laws or advisable for future legislation. As
a solution to problems with exclusive grants perceived by critics, it is
proposed that the patent laws be amended to permit each patentee to
make one, and only one, such grant. That grant could be made for
any territory and time period within the statutory seventeen year limit.
I. THE STATUS OF EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL ASSIGNMENTS
AND LICENSES UNDER EXISTING LAWS

Section 261 of the Patent Act 6 appears to authorize a patentee to
make exclusive territorial assignments:

[P]atents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law
by an instrument in writing.

The . . . patentee . . . may

in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under
his . .

.

patents, to the whole or any specified part of the

United States.'
5
WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. A recent amendment proposed by Senator
Scott to S. 2756, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (reintroduced as S. 643, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971)), would amend the Patent Act to permit the assignment of patent
applications on the same terms as patents themselves and to allow territorial licenses,
whether exclusive or nonexclusive, at the option of the patentee. This bill would
clearly eliminate any possible formalistic distinction between licenses and assignments
implicit in present law.
635 U.S.C. §261 (1964).

7Id. To understand fully the meaning of § 261 as originally enacted in 1836,
one must examine the law then governing the scope and validity of a patent. If
state law determined the rights of the patentee, Congress might have intended §261
to have a more limited, procedural impact than if federal law alone determined these
rights.
Enacted pursuant to U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, the first Patent Act, Act of Apr.
10, 1790 ch 7, 1 Stat. 109, clearly authorized a federal procedure for granting
patents by application to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the
Attorney General. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. 109-10. Its successor, Act of Feb. 21, 1793,
ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, established more than the mere mechanism by which the patent
was granted. In particular, the Act opened the circuit courts of the United States
to the patentee to sue for infringement "in an action on the case founded on this
act .

.

.

."

Id. § 5, 1 Stat. 322.

Although jurisdiction was apparently concurrent

with that of the state courts, id., the courts were to apply federal law as far as
possible. The Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 4, 2 Stat. 38, repealed § 5 of the 1793
Act. The later act provided that the patentee or his heirs or assigns could recover
for infringement "by action on the case founded on this . . . act, in the circuit court
of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof." Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3,
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Although in discussing the issue the courts have not always explicitly
relied on section 261 to sustain exclusive territorial assignments
against antitrust attacks, they have at least adverted to the statute.8
Several commentators also have relied upon section 261 for legislative
approval of exclusive territorial licenses and assignments.'
Professors Baxter, Turner, and Gibbons, however, have taken a
contrary position. They argue that in enacting section 261 Congress
was concerned with distinguishing patent licenses from patent assignments and that Congress never considered the measure in relation to
the substantive propriety of exclusive territorial grants of either nature.
For this reason, and because the nation's first antitrust statute was
enacted more than fifty years after the enactment of section 261, they
conclude that the validity of exclusive territorial grants should be
Resolving the
determined solely by reference to the antitrust laws.'
conflict between these two views of section 261 and of the Sherman Act
requires an examination of the pertinent legislation from the enactment
of section 261, through the passage of the Sherman Act, to the amendment of the Patent Act in 1952.
Prior to 1836 it was unclear whether a patentee could assign an
exclusive territorial right to utilize his invention or whether he could
only license such a right. This distinction was of some consequence.
2 Stat. 38. Any reference to concurrent jurisdiction was eliminated, further reinforcing the suggestion that federal, not state interests were at stake in patent cases.
At least one state court held that it had no jurisdiction under the 1800 Act to
adjudicate an infringement action under the Patent Act, because such jurisdiction
belonged exclusively to the circuit courts of the United States. See Parsons v.
Barnard, 7 Johns. 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1810). Apparently, then, by 1810 judicial
opinion recognized that patent rights must be determined according to federal law
in federal court. See also W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS §855 (1890).
Further congressional action prior to the enactment of § 261 included a provision
granting the circuit courts equity jurisdiction in patent cases in addition to that
which they enjoyed in law pursuant to the 1800 Act. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19,
3 Stat. 481. Interpreting this statute and relying on federal law and general
equitable principles, a federal court sitting in New York refused to issue an injunction
against an infringement, declaring that the plaintiff should maintain an action on
the law side of the federal court to determine the validity of his patent. Undoubtedly,
the law court would base its decision on federal rather than state principles as did
the equity side. Sullivan v. Redfield, 23 F. Cas. 357 (No. 13,597) (C.C.D.N.Y.
1825). Thus Congress enacted §261 in an atmosphere of federal control over both
the substance and procedure of patent grants, and that section should be read as an
integral part of a comprehensive federal policy only incidentally involving any state
interest. Cf. W. PHII.LIpS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INvENTIONS 380 (1837).
SSee, e.g., Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir.
1954).
9See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE: ANTITRUST LAWS 198-202
(1958); R. NoRDHAus & E. Juaow, PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW 141 (1961).
10 See Baxter 349-52, 357 (Professor Baxter, however, qualifies this conclusion
by conceding that section 261 does immunize an exclusive territorial assignment if

the assignee agrees to issue licenses substantially identical to his assignment.);
Gibbons 896-98; Turner 463 n.11, 474 n.21 (Professor Turner adopts Professor

Baxter's analysis of §261 rather than undertaking an independent examination of
the provision.).
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An assignee could sue for infringement, grant licenses under the patent,
and enjoy the benefits of owning property. But a licensee held only
the contractual right to utilize the invention free from liability for
infringment and ordinarily could not transfer his interest or exercise
the other rights of a titleholder.'1 Because of the substantial differences
between assignments and licenses, Congress attempted to delineate the
boundary between the two by enacting section 261 in 1836.1' In
establishing this boundary Congress considered sufficiently comprehensive to warrant classification as an assignment "every grant . .
of the exclusive right . . . to make and use, and to grant to others

to make and use, the thing patented within and throughout any
specified part . . . of the United States." " The current formulation
of section 261, as quoted above,14 was derived from this language.
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890.' Section 1 of the
Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal' 0
The territorial restrictions referred to in section 261 could easily be
interpreted to conflict with this general prohibition of anticompetitive
practices:
A pattern of licenses or assignments which carves the United
States up into geographic subdivisions and thereby confers
on licensees [or assignees] a monopoly position in their respective subdivisions has obvious potential for economic
harm..
* * * [T]he less valuable the invention, the more likely
it is that licensees [or assignees] will be seeking not the
right to use the 7 invention so much as a legal umbrella for
market division.1

Because the Sherman Act was intended to proscribe a loosely defined
class of activities which under certain circumstances would include the
specific activity previously governed by section 261, one must inquire
"See Baxter 349-50.

12 Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 11, 5 Stat. 117. This section and its successors
are collectively referred to in this Article as "section 261," with notation of the
version under consideration when appropriate.
13 Id.

14Text accompanying note 7, supra.
15 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209.
1615 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
17 Baxter 347. See also Gibbons 903; Turner 471, 474.
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whether the Sherman Act's broad language should be read as an interdiction of that activity.
To this question Professors Baxter, Turner, and Gibbons have
replied affirmatively,"8 relying upon their narrow reading of section
261."9 Noting that the statute was enacted to distinguish between
assignments and licenses, they assert that it therefore cannot be construed as authorization for exclusive territorial licenses and assignments, and that even if valid before 1890, such practices are contrary
to the Sherman Act and hence unlawful.20 Professor Baxter concludes:
"Only by amateurish literalism or cynical distortion can it be argued
that § 261 places a general imprimatur of legality on territorial
restrictions."

2

Their thesis, however, is erroneous. First, it fails to weigh adequately implicit congressional authorization of exclusive territorial
grants; second, it ignores the effect of post-Sherman Act amendments
to section 261; third, it reads section 261 without reference to the
broad policy of the Patent Act as a whole; and, finally, it fails to recognize the economic similarity between exclusive licenses and exclusive
assignments.
Professor Baxter 2 correctly notes that section 261 originally differentiated between those territorial grants which constitute assignments and those which are mere licenses, 3 but he fails to recognize
that this congressional expression implied an affirmation of the substantive propriety of exclusive territorial rights. Congress would have
had no reason to define precisely the territorial patent interests which
could be assigned had it not intended to authorize such terfitorial
grants.2 4' The presence of authorizing legislation-even when the
authorization is only implicit-indicates a legislative preference that
cannot be treated lightly by the courts. Although a legislative "event"
18 See Baxter 349. Professors Gibbons and Turner do not advocate proscription;
but they think the Sherman Act permits whatever action is needed to protect antitrust policies from the activities authorized by section 261, and they propose severe
restrictions on that basis.
19
Text accompanying note 10 supra.
20
See Baxter 349-52, 357 (As pointed out above, note 10 supra Baxter qualifies
this conclusion as applied to assignments.) ; Gibbons 903; Turner 473-74.
21 Baxter 349.
22 Because Professor Baxter's analysis of § 261 is the most thorough, and for
the sake of convenience, the ensuing discussion will refer to Baxter as representative
of all three critics, unless otherwise indicated.
23 See Baxter 349.
2
4 Commentary and judicial opinions interpreting § 261 prior to the enactment of
the Sherman Act assumed that territorial grants were lawful and focused on whether
the grant transferred sufficient interest in the patent to constitute an assignment or
merely a license. See Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 205, 219 (1874);
Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 515, 521 (1868); Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S.
(10 How.) 477, 494-95 (1850); A. WALErw, THE PATENT LAWS §287 (1st ed.
1883).
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such as the Sherman Act confers broad powers upon the courts to
delineate its practical scope, in exercising such powers the courts must
give greater deference to activities specifically sanctioned by legislation
than to activities that have never been the subject of legislation.
A greater weakness in Professor Baxter's analysis of the impact
of the antitrust laws on section 261, however, is the summary treatment
he accords the post-Sherman Act congressional and judicial actions
regarding section 261. Congress modified section 261 three times
following enactment of the Sherman Act and each time retained the
language concerning exclusive territorial assignments:
[I]n 1897, the sentence making certificates of notaries prima
facie evidence of execution of an assignment was added; [25]
in 1941 the section was expanded to include applications as
well as patents;

[2'0

and in 1952 the several sentences were

rearranged into their present order

[27]

....

28

On the last of these three occasions, Congress divided the subsection
into two sentences, the second of which states: "The

. .

. patentee...

may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his . . .
patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States." 2
Even if, as Professor Baxter contends, Congress has failed to consider
the economic consequences of permitting exclusive territorial grants,
this repeated restatement of the assignability of exclusive territorial
rights, culminating in a separate statement of the right, militates
strongly against judicial proscription of such a practice under the
Sherman Act.
If a statute is enacted authorizing a specific activity which could
be subsumed under a prior and much broader prohibition, the authorization should prevail. Congressional reiteration and refinement
of the grant of a narrow right subsequent to the enactment of a broad
conflicting prohibition is equivalent to subsequent enactment of the
narrower grant. Since Congress did reenact the authorization of the
right to assign an exclusive territorial right after the Sherman Act,
the authorization should control. Clearly, Congress cannot be presumed to have reenacted the language of section 261 so often without
intending to give it some meaningful effect. Moreover, judicial
opinions following the enactment of the Sherman Act appear to assume
25 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 5, 29 Stat. 693.
26 Act
2735
2

of Aug. 18, 1941, ch. 370, 55 Stat. 634.
U.S.C. §261 (1964).

8 Baxter 351.

29

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1964).
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the validity of exclusive territorial assignments," and the final congressional reaffirmation of section 261 followed those decisions. Congress' choice in the 1951 amendment not to deny the validity of those
judicial assumptions, but, instead, to alter the statutory language to
make the authorization even more palpable, indicates that Congress
has authorized the practice.
Another basic flaw in Professor Baxter's construction of section
261 is his failure to recognize that its conflict with the Sherman Act
is merely symptomatic of the larger conflict between the policy of the
antitrust laws and that of the patent laws. Faced with this conflict
between two accepted economic goals and the failure of Congress to
consider the conflict when enacting either statute, courts should analyze
the strength of the underlying policies, measuring the relative cost to
the patent policy if the Sherman Act were held to repeal section 261
against the damage to the competitive philosophy of the antitrust laws
if section 261 were held to permit exclusive territorial assignments.
Professor Baxter's chief concern is that exclusive territorial rights may
be abused by those who agree to pay royalties to a patentee although
they know the patent to be worthless except as a tool to effectuate
market division." For that reason he advocates proscription of the
practice. 2 Similarly, other critics suggest severe restrictions."
Thus
the potential abuse, not the general use, of exclusive assignments has
prompted criticism. The suggested restrictions therefore do not represent an attempt to conform section 261 to the Sherman Act-a proper
purpose-but an attempt to limit acts authorized by section 261 in
order to prevent the possibility of antitrust violations. But until such
a danger has been proved realistic, and until less drastic remedies have
been exhausted, exclusive territorial assignments should not-under
existing antitrust law-be proscribed or so severely limited. Proscription would not comport with the assumption of their critics 3 4 that
territorial restrictions serve a valuable function insofar as they encourage capital investment, the development of specialized production
techniques, and wider dispersion of the benefits of the patent.35 As
30 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926); Crown
Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 37 (1923) (quoting
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891)).
31
Baxter 347.
32 Id.

See Gibbons 903; Turner 471-74.
34See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT 11; Gibbons 895; Turner 470-74.
15See text accompanying notes 62-71 infra.

33

19711

EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL GRANTS BY PATENTEES

649

Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissenting opinion in International
Salt Co. v. United States:

6

[T] he law also respects the wisdom of not burning even part
of a house in order to roast a pig. Ordinarily, therefore,
when acts are found to have been done in violation of antitrust legislation,
37 restraint of such acts in the future is the
adequate relief.
Interpretation of the Sherman Act as nullifying section 261 would
destroy an important part of the patent law structure in order to eliminate a small and speculative danger.
Finally, Professor Baxter notes: "On its face [section 261]
leaves untouched the validity of territorial restrictions in licenses
..
3 On that basis alone he implies that section 261 plays no
role in determining the applicability of the Sherman Act to such
licenses. 9 He would interpret section 261 to authorize assignments
of exclusive territorial rights, but would add the proviso that the
assignee in turn be compelled to grant licenses equivalent in scope to
the assignment to anyone desiring comparable rights. Similarly, he
would allow a patentee to issue territorially restricted licenses, but after
the first license would compel the patentee to license any other applicant
desiring comparable rights.4" By this distinction between assignments
and licenses he purports to give meaning to the provision entirely
compatible with both the antitrust policy of the Sherman Act and the
legislative purpose imbued in section 261. But this distinction satisfies
neither the legislative purpose nor economic reality. As indicated
earlier, the purpose of section 261 was to distinguish between patent
assignments and patent licenses. Prior to enactment of that section it
was questionable whether a patentee who granted exclusive territorial
rights transferred a sufficient interest to constitute an assignment or
whether such a narrow transfer could constitute only a license; that
is, it was clear that at least a license was permissible, but not whether
an assignment of that nature was permissible. Section 261 made clear
that patentees could make exclusive territorial assignments as well as
36332 U.S. 392 (1947).
37 Id.at 403.
38

Baxter 352.

49

Id. 351-52.

40 Id. 351-52, 357.
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exclusive territorial licenses." Nor would any economic purpose be
served by the distinction between licenses and assignments as those
terms are commonly understood. The difference between the two
forms of transfer is primarily one of legal consequences, with no relevant underlying economic consequences. In each case a single grantee
may be the only one permitted to practice the patent within the territory, and he may practice it to the full extent of the lawful monopoly.
The only limitations on a licensee concern his flexibility and his ability
to recover from infringers. Under these circumstances, an exclusive
territorial licensee is economically equivalent to a territorial assignee,
and should be treated as equivalent-if congressional policy permits the
one, it clearly should permit the other.' Professor Baxter's imposition
on the assignee of an exclusive territorial right of the duty to grant
licenses within his territory also lacks reason: this duty would undercut the economic motive for acquiring an exclusive assignment of
patent rights.
The foregoing analysis, however, only demonstrates that exclusive
territorial assignments and licenses are not proscribed by existing
The wisdom of amending the patent laws to proscribe such
laws.
practices, as the Task Force on Antitrust Policy recommended, remains
to be examined.

II. A REEXAMINATION

OF THE DESIRABILITY OF EXCLUSIVE

TERRITORIAL RIGHTS

Four reasons have been offered for patentees' use of exclusive
territorial grants: " (1) The patentee may be attempting to differentiate prices in regions with different demand characteristics or
different costs of production. 5 (2) The patentee may be yielding to
41 Cf. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1890):
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant and
convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right to make,
use and vend the invention throughout the United States; or, 2d, an undivided

part or share of that exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive right under the
patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States ...
Any assignment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license, giving
the licensee no title in the patent, and no right to sue at law in his own name
for an infringement.
Id. at 255 (emphasis added) ; accord, 4 A. WALYER, supra note 1, at § 343, at 376-77;
Ellis, Validity of Doctrine That a Full Exclusive License Is in Fact an Assignment,
36 J.42PAT. OFF. Soc'v 643 (1954).
See Gibbons 898.
43 "Proscribed" of course includes limitations, such as those suggested by Professor Gibbons, which are so severe as to emasculate § 261.
44 In keeping with the foregoing discussion, the term "grants" will include assignments and licenses, and the term "territorial licensing" will include territorial assignments.
45 See Baxter 347.
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the "unrecoverable sunk cost" argument of prospective licensees: the
promotional or developmental costs necessary to utilize the invention
are so great that the license will be worthless unless the initial licensee
in a particular region is given the opportunity to earn sufficient
monopoly profits to recover those costs before additional licensees are
permitted to benefit from his initial investment. 46 (3) The patentee
may be attempting to induce entities with risk-taking resources to
assume or share the risk involved in developing or marketing his invention.4 7 (4) The patentee may be aiding some or all of the companies in a particular industry to effectuate horizontal market
division. s
Although other reasons may motivate the practice, only these four
appear to offer a reasonable possibility of economic advantage to
patentees. Unfortunately, no empirical data are available to indicate
which, if any, of these reasons in fact explains the practice. While
exclusive territorial grants may be used at times without any sound
reason, permitting this practice is unjustifiable because neither the
patentee nor the public benefits from a misallocation of resources favoring the grantee. Therefore, the following analysis will be limited to
the above four reasons for using exclusive territorial grants. The desirability of each goal and the effectiveness and potential harmfulness
of this manner of achieving it, as well as the availability of substitute
means, will be examined.
A. Price Differentiation

A patentee engages in price differentiation 9 by varying the
royalties he charges his licensees in accordance with their respective
purchaser demand functions. The appeal that such a system holds
for a patentee can be demonstrated by a brief example: Suppose that
P holds a patent for air conditioners. Suppose further that the cost
of producing air conditioners does not depend upon the location of the
plant. Suppose finally that the demand for air conditioners is such
that many Arizona residents will pay at least five hundred dollars to
own one, but that few Oregon residents will pay more than three hundred dollars for the same item. Clearly if P manufactures and sells
his product at the same price in both states, he will fail to maximize
46

See Gibbons 895; Turner 462.

47 See Gibbons 895; Turner 462.

4sSee Baxter 347; Gibbons 902-03; Turner 471, 474.
491in certain respects price differentiation closely resembles traditional price
discrimination. As Professor Baxter has shown at length, howvever, a precise
definition of price discrimination must exclude the type of differentiation with which
this Article is concerned. See Baxter 280-99.
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his profits. Similarly, if he licenses others to manufacture and sell,
he will reap greater profits by charging higher royalties in Arizona
than in Oregon. By differentiating his royalty charge, the patentee
5
attempts to maximize his profit within each geographical market. "
Exclusive territorial licensing contains two levels of restriction:
the territorial restriction, by means of which the patentee establishes
territories but does not necessarily restrict the number of licensees in
each geographical region, and the exclusivity restriction, by means of
which only one license is granted in each region. Therefore, as a
method for testing the validity of the claim that territorially exclusive
restrictions aid in the program of price differentiation, the following
analysis will examine first the problems a patentee encounters in using
non-exclusive territorially restricted licensing to differentiate prices,
and then the benefits and disadvantages he incurs by adding the exclusivity restriction.
Territorially restricted licensing can aid the patentee in establishing a price-differentiation system by preventing the "favored" licensees
who pay lower royalties from selling at low prices in the territories
allocated to the "disfavored" licensees. The patentee would use territorially restricted licensing to effect price differentiation and maximize
his profit by charging all licensees in any given region a royalty commensurate with the demand function in their sales region. Naturally,
the patentee's incentive to implement price differentiation depends upon
his receiving returns greater than the administrative costs of the
system, and his incentive increases as his returns rise above his costs.
50 The patentee's approach can be illustrated graphically as follows:

A

PB

B

Output;
Output

SMC (short-run marginal cost) in A = SMC in B
In both region A and region B the short-run marginal costs (SMC) incurred
in producing the product are assumed constant and equal. The demand curve (solid
line) in A, however, is more elastic than the demand curve (solid line) in B. Since
a monopolist maximizes his profits by setting his price at the intersection of his
short-run marginal cost curve and his marginal revenue curve (broken line) in any
given market, a different maximizing price will result for A, where the maximizing
price will be PA, than for B, where the maximizing price will be PB- See R.
LEF1WIcH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOcATION 197-200 (3d ed. 1966).
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But several factors impair the patentee's ability to differentiate through
territorially restricted licensing.
First, there are enforcement problems. The most significant of
these arises from arbitrageurs-individuals who buy from licensees in
a favored territory and resell in a disfavored territory. Though partially deterred by the costs inherent in their duplication of the licensee's
activities, those individuals are protected from infringement actions by
the established doctrine that the patentee's monopoly is "exhausted" by
the first sale of his patented product.5' The patentee must also cope
with "foreign customers"--individuals who reside in a disfavored territory and cross into a favored territory to make their purchases. Given
adjacent territories with differing demand functions, the patentee would
have to require each licensee to demand proof of each purchaser's
domicile, a requirement neither easy to administer nor likely to generate
consumer goodwill. Moreover, the patentee must prevent the favored
licensees themselves from transporting the patented product across their
designated boundaries and into less favored territories. Although such
activities would breach the licensing agreements, significant regional
price discrepancies are likely to evoke a certain amount of clandestine
competition among licensees from different territories.
The difficulty a patentee experiences with enforcement is likely to
increase with the degree of differentiation-as the price discrepancy between any two territories increases because of royalty rates, the amount
of interterritorial trade will increase. Indeed, if interterritorial trade
becomes sufficiently lucrative because of significant price discrepancies
among the territories, the patentee's system could collapse. This enforcement problem is mitigated, of course, by the costs of transportation
between the markets, but this is an independent reason militating
against any need for territorial licensing rather than proof of its
effectiveness.'
USee, e.g., Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659 (1895); Adams
v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
62 Professor Gibbons asserts:
Domestic territorial restrictions typically are employed where the licensed
activity has only a limited geographic market. Where the restriction concerns a product, the transportation cost of the product is usually high compared to its price by volume, with the result that its "natural" market is
local or regional. Where the process or product licensed involves a service
activity, the demand for the service is usually local. Because the market
normally has "natural" territorial limitations, effective exploitation of the
patent requires that the activity be practiced at several or a number of places.
Gibbons, supra note 2, at 894-95. However, to the extent that Professor Gibbons'
observations are accurate, the patentee need not impose legal restrictions on his
various territorial licensees if he seeks to differentiate prices; the natural barriers
to interterritorial competition should be sufficiently high to allow him to establish a
differential system. Thus, in the great majority of cases the magnitude of enforcement problems varies inversely with the height of natural barriers. In short, for a
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A second problem arises if the patented invention is valuable
primarily because it reduces the cost of producing an old product. The
producers must be induced to switch from their old production methods
if the patentee is to establish a profitable price-differentiation scheme
through territorially restricted licensing. This problem constitutes
a substantial deterrent to effective price differentiation through territorially restricted licensing because an existing competitive end-product
market imposes a ceiling on the price licensees can charge, and an
existing monopolistic end-product market, unless destroyed, will prevent production of the quantity of goods yielding maximum royalties.
In every case, however, the first impediment is the difficulty of
determining when and where identifiable, distinct markets exist that
are conducive to price differentiation. If the patented product or
process merely reduces the cost of producing an old product, the
patentee's problems with the end-product demand may not be great
because he faces a preestablished market. But if the patent is on a new
or improved end product, the profit-maximizing royalty rate is difficult
to determine because the demand function is unknown. Obviously,
trying to anticipate demand functions and production costs in several
regions compounds the difficulty.
In summary, territorial restrictions alone are unlikely to effect
profitable price differentiation. Added administrative costs, enforcement problems, resistance to changes in production methods, and difficulties in accumulating the necessary economic data all coalesce to force
this conclusion.
If the patentee grants exclusive territorial licenses, he may more
successfully and cheaply solve one aspect of his enforcement problems-preventing licensees from engaging in clandestine interterritorial
competition-because he will have fewer licensees to watch. However,
none of the other impediments to effective price differentiation would
be affected.
Moreover, it is generally in a patentee's best interest to license all
those desiring licenses in a particular territory.63 If the patentee were
to manufacture and sell the end product of his invention rather than
to grant licenses, he would maximize profits by selling at a price and
output determined by the intersection of his marginal revenue curve
and his short-run marginal cost curve., 4 He could also reap maximum
profits by granting sufficient licenses to ensure that competitive pricing
patentee attempting to enforce territorially restricted licensing in order to achieve
price differentiation, the incremental effect of such licensing will be reduced by
either its redundancy or ineffectiveness, or a combination of the two.
53 See Turner, supra note 2, at 462, 465-69.
54See R. LEFTWicH, supra note 50, at 197-200.
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conditions prevail at the retail level and charging a royalty equal to
the difference between his licensees' prices for the quantity they would
produce if operating as monopolists free of the royalty and their shortrun marginal costs. Under those conditions, each licensee would view
his royalty obligation as an added cost of production, and the market
price of the end product would equal the higher cost of production incurred by the licensees.
If the patentee grants an exclusive license, however, he places the
licensee in a monopoly position in the retail market for the end product.
The licensee will therefore seek to sell at a price and output determined
by the intersection of his marginal revenue curve and his short-run
marginal cost curve, including in his cost the royalty he must pay the
patentee.
This can be illustrated graphically as follows:
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If the end-product demand curve is DA, the patentee would like
the price to be P and the royalty payments to him to be the area enclosed within PABC; this enables him to squeeze the full monopoly
benefit from the licensee, who will not produce more because he would
be compelled to lower his price below his costs to dispose of the
product. At that royalty rate (P-C), however, the licensee's short-run
marginal cost curve rises from SMC to PA. To maximize his own
profits, the exclusive licensee will sell at P'," reducing the output to 0'
and the royalty payments to PQEC, an area smaller than PABC.56
The patentee will lose the difference between the two unless he can
control the price at which his licensees sell.
65 See id.
6
See id.
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Though the right of a patentee to fix the prices at which his
licensees sell was upheld in United States v. General Electric Co.,5 7 the

continuing validity of that case is questionable. 5 Moreover, when the
patentee's invention is not an end product-for instance, when the invention is only part of a complex machine--courts have generally prohibited restrictions on pricing and distribution of the end product by the
patentee, holding such restrictions to be unlawful "extensions" of the
patent. 59

Making territorial licenses exclusive therefore adds little to the
patentee's ability to establish a profitable price differentiating system and
can often detract from such a system. Thus, if other reasons exist to
proscribe exclusive territorial licensing, the desire of some patentees to
differentiate prices on a territorial basis should not be considered a valid
objection to proscribing exclusive licensing.
B. Initial Investment Costs
Initial investment costs-those accruing prior to the commencement
of manufacturing and selling-can consist of promotional costs, development costs, capital investments, or any combination of these three
which the licensee attempting to market the invention incurs. The
initial investment costs which might induce a patentee to grant an
exclusive territorial license are those borne only by an initial licensee in
a particular region-only if the initial developer incurs costs which redound to the benefit of subsequent licensees will the patentee be compelled to induce development of the invention by compensating the
developer differently from these later licensees.6"
Consider, for example, an invention which is valuable only if certain
expenditures are made to improve it. Suppose relative certainty that the
final product can be developed after a reasonable amount of effort, that
the demand for the final product can be estimated, and that the improvements are not patentable.' Under these circumstances, the licensee will
seek a royalty agreement permitting him to recover his initial investment
and sell the final product at a price allowing him a reasonable rate of
return. Naturally, this licensee fears that subsequent licensees will have
lower initial development costs because of external economies generated
57272 U.S. 476 (1926).
58See P. AREEDA, ANTRaUST ANA.ysls 339 (1967). See also United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 315-21 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
-59
See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949).
60
Subsequent licensees will benefit from the developmental efforts of the initial
licensee either if technology flows freely within the industry or if the end product
effectively discloses the fruits of the developer's labor.
61Although no-risk developmental ventures are probably a rarity, cf. Turner,
supra note 2, at 462, the investment costs argument should be confronted.
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by his expenditures and will consequently be able to undersell him in the
marketplace.
To insure that the initial licensee receives a reasonable return on his
investment, the patentee may grant an exclusive territorial license enabling the licensee to receive monopoly profits in his territory for a
period long enough to amortize his initial investment costs. But an
exclusive territorial license may be unnecessary to the recovery of those
costs. The patentee could simply pay the initial licensee a lump sum
equal to the unrecoverable costs attributable to special efforts in developing the invention, and then charge the same royalty to all licensees.
Alternatively, the patentee could give the initial licensee preferential
royalty treatment to the extent his initial investment costs exceed those
of subsequent licensees.
The most obvious reason that a patentee would grant an exclusive
license is that he lacks the capital necessary to initiate the venture.
Assuming, however, that the marketability of the end product is
assured, either the patentee-or if the patentee is not well established, a
licensee with a more solid financial structure or better credit ratingshould be able to find a source of investment capital without resorting
to exclusive territorial licensing. Thus, because the patentee has alternative means of compensating the initial licensee for his sunk cost investment when little risk is involved, exclusive territorial licensing is unnecessary to encourage licensees to develop the invention. If other
reasons exist for proscribing the practice, the initial investment cost
argument should not justify its retention.
C. Risk Compensation
Two general types of risk may be involved in the development or
promotion of an invention: first, the risk that the invention as patented
can never be developed into a valuable product; second, the risk that the
public will reject the product-in spite of its social utility, and after a
large sum has been spent in developing and preparing to manufacture
and sell the product. Of course, the risk may involve a combination of
these two forms.
As an example of the first type of risk, suppose the patentee has
invented a process which cures cancer in rats and involves a certain
strain of bacteria. Suppose further that the only value of the invention
in its present state is the potential application of a similar process to
cure cancer in humans if thousands of bacterial strains are substituted
for the one used in the patented process. Such research will involve
substantial costs and, even then, success will be uncertain. The patentee
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in this situation does not have access to the many sources of investment capital available in the negligible-risk cases discussed above because here the product may never be developed, and investors will be
unwilling to extend credit with no more security than the mere possibility of success. Even if they could borrow the money, many patentees
would be reluctant to incur personal obligations to the extent necessary
to guarantee the repayment of the loans. The patentee, unwilling or
unable to develop the invention himself, must entice a prospective
licensee to take or share the risk. Obviously, potential rewards
greater than the going rate of return must be promised the prospective
licensee to lure him into the venture.
One inducement the patentee can offer is an exclusive territorial
license. The territory need not reflect any particular market, but its
size and composition should be determined only by the relative bargaining strength of the parties. The patentee has the basic invention; the
prospective licensee has the risk-taking resources. The only question
is how much the patentee must give the prospective licensee to induce
him to participate. Furthermore, the patentee should have to grant
only one such license in order to have his invention developed. Once
the developmental problems are solved by the initial licensee, the
patentee can make the necessary information available to any number
of licensees outside the exclusive territory reserved for the initial
licensee.
The Task Force and Professors Turner and Gibbons recognize
the valuable role of exclusive territorial licensing in inducing development of high-risk inventions. Each suggests that when the risk involved necessitates additional licensing flexibility for the patentee, exclusive territorial grants be excepted from proscription.'
Professor Gibbons proposes substantial limitations on the use of
the device even for encouraging risk-taking. However, in his first suggested constraint, that "[a]ny exemption should be limited to a short
development period," ' he fails to appreciate the fundamental reason
for permitting the exemption: the patentee needs the services of reluctant developers and must provide sufficient incentive. In this respect, the length of the licensing period, like the size of the territory,
can be varied with the degree of risk involved to determine the size
of the potential reward available to the prospective licensee. Restricting the permissible licensing period would only force patentees to grant
larger exclusive territories; but the long-range threat to competition
62
See TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 5, at 11; Gibbons, supra note 2, at 895;
Turner, supra note 2, at 462.
63 Gibbons, mepra note 2, at 895.
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should be no more serious if a small territory is monopolized for
seventeen years than if a larger territory is monopolized for fewer
years.
The arbitary nature of Professor Gibbons' second suggested restriction, limiting use of the device to "patented technology with a high
degree of novelty," 64 is readily apparent-as are its inherent administrative problems. Indeed, the patent office has a difficult task in
determining what is "novel" under the patent laws presently in existence; adding the further limitation of "a high degree" can only
compound that problem.
Professor Gibbons proposes thirdly:
Limitation of the size of the licensee, geared to the capital
requirements of the particular industry, should also be required, because a major reason for the exemption is encouraging small businesses which have limited power to attract development capital.'
This suggestion, too, presents obvious administrative problems and
ignores the rationale for the use of the device. Exclusive territorial
licenses are justifiable to encourage the introduction and development
of patented technology by inducing some prospective licensee to take the
necessary risk. In many cases the small businesses "which have
limited power to attract development capital" " will, like the patentee,
be either unable to acquire the capital required to take the risk or
unwilling to gamble their very existence on one long shot. Therefore,
the patentee should not be foreclosed from seeking help from larger
entities. Furthermore, without the restriction recommended by Professor Gibbons, patentees in need of a development risk-taker will not
necessarily run to the nearest corporate giant.
Professor Gibbons suggests one other restriction:
The exemption should not be available to protect restrictions
on distribution by the licensees, for these should be illegal
per se; it should apply only to the issuance of exclusive territorial licenses by the patentee. Territorial protection of making and using the invention should be an adequate inducement
to prospective licensees without the addition of a monopoly to
sell in the territory, which would involve risks of a collusive
cartel. 7
This rule arbitrarily discriminates against all prospective licensees
operating in territories without convenient natural barriers. If the
641d.
65 Id.

661d.
67 Id.
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manufacturer-seller licensed by the patentee under Professor Gibbons'
rule to make and use the patented invention happens to have high
natural barriers to protect his territory, he will in fact have the
monopoly on sales feared by Professor Gibbons. If, however, the
licensee is not so blessed, licensees in other territories will be easily able
to compete in that territory, and an exclusive license applying only to
manufacture and use will be worth no more than a nonexclusive
license. Not only does this rule arbitrarily favor one group of developers, but it also defeats the very purpose for which the device is
permitted; few licensees will be lured into a high-risk venture with the
promise of an exclusive license to manufacture in a territory into which
the end product can be shipped with ease from adjacent territories.
Although Professor Turner and the Task Force also recognize
the role of exclusive territorial licensing in encouraging risk-taking,
they suggest its prohibition unless the patentee can prove to the satisfaction of an examining body-perhaps the patent office-that exclusivity is "necessary to anyone's undertaking exploitation of the
patent in that territory." "8 This is a substantial improvement over an
outright proscription, but evidentiary problems might prevent many
patentees from convincing the examining body that exclusivity is truly
necessary. In those cases, the patentees would be left with the choice
of abandoning development altogether or assigning the entire patent to
one purchaser. To the extent that the latter course is followed,
national monopolies will replace the limited monopolies that would
otherwise have appeared.
Professor Turner's further suggestion, that the rule should require the patentee to show the need for exclusivity "for a reasonable
period of time," 9 poses even greater problems for the patentee. If
this proposal implies that the examiners should have the authority to
determine the life of the license-with a maximum life equal to the
life of the patent-and, perhaps, to set limits on the size of the territory
or territories, the patent examiner will be required to make judgments
of a business nature which are beyond his competence. The bargaining
between the patentee and his prospective licensees would also be affected
both before and after the patentee approaches the examiners for permission to employ exclusive territorial licensing, and the patentee might
even find himself forced to contract with a licensee who satisfies the
mandate of the examiners rather than with the licensee or licensees with
whom he would prefer to associate.
68 Turner, supra note 2, at 474; see
69
Turner, supra note 2, at 462.

TASK FORCE REPORT,

supra note 5, at 22.
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The second type of risk which might cause the patentee to grant
exclusive territorial licenses is promotional risk-the risk that the
public may reject the invention after substantial promotional investment (such as advertising) or capital investment (such as expensive
manufacturing machinery) .7' The foregoing discussion of developmental risk applies in general to promotional risk, but the two differ in
certain respects.
First, whereas developmental risk might inhere in a patent on a
new product, a new subproduct, or a new process, promotional risk
should not significantly affect the inventor of either a new subproduct
or a new process. This is because the largest promotional costs are
those incurred in appeals to the taste and needs of the general publicappeals not necessary for these types of inventions. For example, the cost
of advertising on television and in other communications media can
be exorbitant. If the invention merely lowers production costs or
constitutes a more reliable part in a complex piece of equipment the
promotional expenses incurred will generally be negligible. Existing
promotional methods, such as periodic visits to manufacturers from
salesmen, often suffice to introduce a new cost-saving device; and existing general advertising programs can usually be modified to inform
the general public of newly lowered retail prices or of higher quality
parts. Therefore, with regard to a new subproduct or process, promotional risk-taking is little influenced by the resolution of the question
whether to allow exclusive territorial licensing.
But whereas a patentee will rarely need to grant more than one
exclusive territorial license to induce a prospective licensee to develop
the invention, 7 ' patentees may more frequently need to grant several

such licenses to market the invention on a nationwide basis. Special
incentives may be needed in each region because demand for any given
product may vary greatly from region to region. Successful marketing
of the invention in Arizona may not be sufficient to induce a prospective
licensee in Alaska to invest promotional and investment capital in his
region. Thus, although the developmental risk is dispelled for all
future licensees once an invention has been technologically perfected,
the patentee may need promotional risk-takers in each new territory
in which he wishes to market his invention.
Extensive use of exclusive territorial licensing to induce prospective licensees to take promotional risks is partly obviated by the prob70 Consider, for instance, the problem faced by the patentee of three-dimensional
television. Although the invention would probably have considerable intrinsic appeal
for the public, the cost or inconvenience of any necessary special equipment might
make the invention a commercial failure.
71 See text preceding note 62, supra.
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ability that the amounts involved in testing the marketability of an
invention for a localized region are relatively small. That promotional
risks are often small enough to be met without special treatment is
illustrated by the willingness of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers in many industries to introduce new products without patent
protection and potential monopoly profits: "new" kitchen cleansers,
facial soaps, toothpastes, detergents, and clothing styles appear daily, yet
all require significant promotional investment. If such risk-takers are
available for unpatented new products, it seems safe to assume that
risk-takers will generally be available for patented new products, particularly after the patented invention has been successfully marketed
in one or more test territories. Insofar as there may be exceptions to
this rule, the necessary exclusive territorial grants could be allowed
after adequate proof and subject to the discretion of patent authorities.
Thus, exclusive territorial grants encourage both developmental
and promotional risk-taking, enabling a patentee to realize the full value
of his invention and the public to benefit from use of the patented
product. Unless this type of grant results uniformly in anticompetitive
practices, the patentee should be permitted as a matter of course to
grant one, and only one, exclusive territorial license or assignment.
Allowing more than one would aid neither the public nor, in most
instances, the patentee.
D. Collusive Cartels
The spectre causing Professors Baxter, Gibbons, and Turner, and
the Task Force to suggest either proscription or severe limitation of
exclusive territorial licensing is the collusive cartel.' Professor Gibbons describes an admittedly "extreme" example of potential cartelization as follows:
The situation . . . is where the patentee and licensee are

the only firms in the industry, there is substantial competition
between them in Midwest markets, the patent is of doubtful
validity and of small commercial significance even if valid.
Further, the license is exclusive and, after it has been executed, competition between the parties ceases not only as to
the product manufacturd [sic] by the process, which the
licensee does not even employ, but as to the entire range of
associated products that both parties73 sell and that are not
expressly affected by the restriction.
72
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 11; Baxter, supra note 2, at 347;
Gibbons, supra note 2, at 903; Turner, supra note 2, at 471, 474.
73 Gibbons, supra note 2, at 902.
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The solution proposed by Professor Turner and the Task Force
and the accompanying problems have already been discussed. 74 Professor Baxter's solution is to require any patentee 'vho licenses one
person to license all others on the same terms. 7- This would permit
territorially restricted licensing with an unlimited number of licensees
in each region, but not exclusive territorial licensing with only one
licensee per region. Professor Gibbons suggests that
where the competition that is expressly restrained by the
territorial limitation on the licensee concerns an activity
. . . that is not completely covered by the licensed patent,

the restriction should be considered illegal per se and a misuse
of the patent.76
Before adopting either of the suggested restrictions, however, the
probability that such cartels would result from exclusive territorial
grants should be established. As Professor Gibbons indicates,17 and
as reported cases concerning such cartels show,' the prerequisites for
this type of profitable cartel often make it highly visible to antitrust
prosecutors. If the patent is truly valuable and applicable to the industry in question, the patentee should be unwilling to assist the conspiracy, for, as already noted,7" patentees will avoid issuing exclusive
licenses when the invention is valuable.8 " Hence, to be a device for
cartelization, the patent must be of little or no value to the industry,
neither cutting costs of production nor creating a larger market. Further, in order to prevent existing, rather than prospective, producers
from contesting the arrangement or destroying its effectiveness through
competition, all of them must be included in the cartel, automatically
restricting use of the device to cases approximating Professor Gibbons'
"extreme" example of two national producers. When a highly concentrated industry is engaged in horizontal market division on the
basis of exclusive territorial licenses, the patent itself, the applicability
of the patent to the industry, the actual use or non-use of the patent,
and each step leading to the decision to adopt the patented product or
process will invite close scrutiny. And if, as in Professor Gibbons'
example, the conspirators begin to extend the market division to
74 See text accompanying notes 68-69 .supra.

75 See Baxter, supra note 2, at 347.

76 Gibbons, supra note 2, at 903.

7 See id. 902.
78See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
'19 See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
8
0 Naturally, the patentee holding a valuable patent may be compelled to grant
an exclusive license to compensate a risk-taking licensee. See text accompanying
notes 62-71 mspra.
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products unrelated to the invention, prosecution under the Sherman
Act is likely to follow.
Furthermore, as with any monopoly situation, if the patent is of
negligible value to the industry in question and the extant producers
adopt it only to raise prices, new entrants seeking a share of the
monopoly profits will be encouraged to compete without using the
cartel-effectuating invention. Entry may be difficult when several other
important patents relating to a complex end product are held by extant
producers, but their refusal to grant licenses to new entrants while
licensing each other will provide further evidence of the cartel. Since
patentees will rarely have to grant more than one exclusive territorial
license restricting distribution in order to obtain developmental risktakers,"' and since such grants are rarely necessary or useful for other
reasons, the mere existence of a system in which several major entities
in a given industry hold exclusive territorial licenses to the same
patented invention will provide substantial evidence that a cartel exists.
Because the desirability of ensuring rapid adoption of patented
technology calls for the use of exclusive territorial licensing, and because the major evil perceived by the Task Force and Professors
Baxter and Turner can be eliminated by applying existing antitrust
laws, exclusive territorial grants should not be proscribed solely on the
basis of a general fear, unsupported by empirical data, of extensive
collusion.
Professor Gibbons' suggestion that the device should be illegal
per se when "the competition that is expressly restrained . .
concerns an activity . . . that is not completely covered by the licensed

patent" ' is a somewhat narrower restriction than that suggested by
Professor Baxter and the Task Force. If read literally, the Gibbons
rule is unobjectionable, for it merely proscribes express restrictions on
nonpatented items. That a stereo system may contain a certain type of
patented speaker is no reason to permit the patentee to restrain stereo
manufacturers from transporting and selling all stereo systems, whether
they contain the patented item or not.
However, if, as Professor Gibbons' examples indicate, he meant
to preclude a patentee from restricting the distribution of his invention
if it is physically incorporated in some larger item, the rule is needlessly arbitrary. Under such a rule, the inventor of a completely new
end product could grant exclusive territorial licenses, but no other
patentee could do so. This rule completely ignores the fact that the
value of many, and probably most, patents depends upon their incor81 See text preceding note 62 supra.
82 Gibbons, spra note 2, at 903.

1971]

EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIAL GRANTS BY PATENTEES

665

poration in an unpatented end product. Like the rule suggested by
Professors Baxter and Turner and the Task Force, it fails to consider
the visibility of any cartel based upon horizontal market division
through use of a valueless patent. Consequently, the Gibbons rule
should also be rejected.
III. A COMPROMISE
Although the foregoing discussion indicates that exclusive territorial licensing should be permitted, its limited utility and the added
burden on the judiciary resulting from a permissive approach suggest
the advisability of an administratively simple compromise. The compromise proposed by the Task Force and Professor Turner is neither
administratively simple nor likely to permit use of exclusive territorial
licensing, even when necessary; 83 and the proposal of Professor
Gibbons is rife with difficulties."4 But a workable compromise which
should prove satisfactory to both critics and proponents of exclusive
territorial licensing is available: A patentee should be allowed to grant
one exclusive territorial license, the size and composition of the territory
and the length of the exclusive period to be determined by the bargaining process. Additional exclusive grants should be allowed if made
pursuant to the proposal of the Task Force and Professor Turner-by
application to an administrative official. This rule should satisfy proponents of exclusive territorial licenses, because exclusive territorial
licensing is rarely needed except to encourage entrepreneurial investment of risk capital for development purposes, and a patentee should
rarely need to grant more than one exclusive license to promote development of a risky invention. To the extent that localized promotional problems require additional exclusive grants the patentee
could be allowed to apply for special permission to use them upon a
demonstration of necessity, even though some patentees might be discouraged from doing so by the burden of proof.
This rule should satisfy Professors Baxter, Turner, and Gibbons,
and the Task Force, because collusive cartels effectuated by a network
of regional monopolies will be avoided by permitting only one exclusive license. Indeed, other producers, extant and potential, could
still freely sell in the sole exclusive territory products made without
employing the invention; and the exclusive licensee still faces the
problem of arbitrage discussed above.
Finally, the patentee's dis83 See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
84
8

See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
5 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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incentive to grant an exclusive license unless absolutely necessary limits
abuse or extensive use of exclusive territorial grants.
One apparent drawback to this rule is that it permits the sole
exclusive licensee to develop a consumer preference for his product in
his region during the life of the license. But this consumer preference
should have only limited impact on the competitive situation following
expiration of the exclusive license. Licensees in adjoining regions will
be selling the same type of product, will be free to compete in the
exclusive territory using noninfringing products, and will have a
strong incentive to enter the exclusive territory once the exclusive
86
license expires. Moreover, a patentee could assign his entire patent,
and the consequences flowing from the assignment of one limited territory would undoubtedly be less serious.
This limitation on the patentee's present legal right to grant exclusive territorial assignments and licenses under section 261 of the
Patent Act would permit him to compensate a risk-taking licensee for
developing the patent without encouraging the formation of cartels as
feared by Professors Baxter, Gibbons, and Turner, and by the White
House Task Force on Antitrust Policy. Implementation of the rule
suggested in this Article will minimize the potential conflict between
the antitrust laws and the Patent Act, permitting a reasonable return
to inventors within the framework of the competitive system.
S6 See 35 U.S.C. §261 (1964), which states in part: "[P]atents . . . shall be
assignable in law .

.

.

."

Professor Baxter's critical analysis of the portion of

section 261 authorizing exclusive territorial assignments is inapplicable to this phrase,
for the problem of defining the scope of assignable rights as opposed to licensable
rights is absent.
Professor Turner, however, has suggested that the assignability of patents should
be limited in instances where the patent to be assigned constitutes an "asset" within
the meaning of the Clayton Act:
At the outset, I shall simply assert categorically that Section 7 of the
Clayton Act-which prohibits the acquisition of all or any part of the assets
of a corporation where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly-applies to the acquisition of either a patent
or an exclusive license ...
If established section 7 principles are to be applied, the statute would
be interpreted to prohibit any company from acquiring a patent or an
exclusive license of [significant competitive] importance . ...
Turner, supra note 2, at 460. But even that limitation would not impede the
effectiveness of the proposed compromise, for it would effectively permit exclusive
licensing when a high developmental or, on rare occasions, marketing risk exists.
In such instances, the large acquiring corporation would not be acquiring an asset
of recognized great value; rather, it would be acquiring the possibility of gaining
such an asset. Indeed, since the raw patent presumably cannot attract small developers, the role of the large developer is analogous to that of a company hiring a
scientist to do internal research and development work for the company.

